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Sammendrag 
Dette arbeidet anvender et ikkekooperativt spill brukt i litteraturen om internasjonalt klimasamarbeid, 
og finner at en internasjonal klimaavtale med kvotehandel innenfor denne teoretiske rammen gir 
høyere utslipp av klimagasser og effektivitetstap. 
1 Introduction
Economic theory and common wisdom tell us that emissions trading may
give immediate e¢ ciency rewards as this markets invisible hand ensures
that emission cuts occur where cutting costs are low. However, it com-
plicates matters that in an international setting the initial allocation of
emission quotas is not determined by nature or any supranational agency.
Rather, the volume and distribution of permits must be approved by in-
dividual governments. The question we raise is whether targets will be
set di¤erently in anticipation of trade, and whether that would outweigh
the potential gains from trade. We nd that it does, giving higher global
emissions and reduced e¢ ciency compared to a game without trade.
Our analysis is based on a climate policy game which is character-
ized by lack of e¢ cient bargaining when an international agreement on
emission reductions is settled. We assume that the governments set their
national emission targets individually based on national interests. The
climate negotiations over the last years indicate that this approach is
relevant. Recall, for example, that the national emission targets in the
Copenhagen Accord, which have been leading in the subsequent negotia-
tions, where quantied by individual governments after the Copenhagen
meeting. Hence, those targets are not a result of negotiations and are
therefore unlikely to maximize joint welfare, as most commonly assumed
in the literature.
Our game represents an extension of the climate policy game found
in Helm (2003). While he applied general functional forms, we adopt
the linear quadratic model and assume that each country is composed
of a varying number of identical rms.
Our result contrasts with Carbone et al. (2009) and a comment
on their approach is therefore appropriate. Based on the simulations
of a calibrated general equilibrium model of the world economy, they
concluded that a system of internationally tradable emission permits
could enhance abatement considerably. They found that total emission
reductions in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium with trading is approx-
imately twice the abatement level in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium
without trading, and about two-thirds of the abatement level in a rst-
best agreement.
Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2009) found that whether emissions
trading in this type of games leads to increased or reduced emissions
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depends on the relationship between the countriesmarginal damage
costs and the steepness of their marginal abatement cost functions. It
follows that the assumptions in Carbone et al. (2009) with regard to the
marginal damage cost parameters are crucial for their results. Carbone
et al. (2009) were not very specic on how they estimated these parame-
ters, other than saying that countries reveal their willingness to pay for
emission reductions through their positions in the international climate
negotiations. They assumed a marginal value of abatement (marginal
damage costs) of 300 USD/tC for Western Europe, and 150 for Japan
and the United States. Furthermore, assumed marginal damage costs of
50 USD/tC for the FSU and zero for China. In addition they analyzed
a case where the marginal damage costs are adjusted upwards to 50
and 100 USD/tC in China and the FSU, respectively, resulting in very
similar results to their main case.
For example, the fact that the permit price in the European permit
market is currently (spring 2012) close to 25 USD/tC indicates that other
values assigned to Europe also could be plausible. The other countries
and regionsassumed marginal damage costs could be discussed along
the same lines, not least their suggestion that China does not expect
any costs related to climate change, which is in contrast to literature
suggesting that the developing countries will have to carry the highest
costs of climate change; see for example Mendelsohn et al. (2006).
Another closely related paper is Godal and Holtsmark (2011). They
extended the climate policy game introduced by Helm (2003) to include
endogenous emission taxes. As emissions of CO2 is closely connected
to the quantities of fossil energy used, this could be interpreted as en-
ergy taxes, which are widespread in use. With their model Godal and
Holtsmark (2011) found that if governments fully act on their incen-
tives, international emissions trading will achieve no e¢ ciency gains and
emissions will be as in the situation without trade. However, Godal
and Holtsmark (2011) found that emissions trading within their game
will redistribute income away from countries with high marginal climate
costs to countries with low marginal climate costs. Other closely related
literature includes Cramton and Stoft (2010a, 2010b) and MacKenzie
(2011). 1
The next section presents the theoretical model and our result. The
1For an overview of other relevant literature, see Finus (2008).
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subsequent section concludes. The proof of our result can be found in
the Appendix.
2 Analysis
There is a set of countries I = f1; :::; ng. Each country i 2 I is composed
of a government and mi rms. Each rm has quadratic abatement costs
cji (aji) =

2
a2ji; (1)
where  is a positive parameter and aji is the abatement carried out by
rm j in country i. If abatement is carried out e¢ ciently within each
country, country i has abatement cost functions that could be written
in the conventional quadratic format:
ci(ai) = min
aji; j=2f1;:::;mig
 
miX
j=1

2
a2ji
!
=
i
2
a2i ; (2)
where ai is total abatement in country i and i := =mi: The countries
experience linear benets from global emission abatement bi 
 P
i2I ai

;
where bi is a parameter. As benets from global emission abatement is
a public good, we assume that bi is proportional to the size of economy
i; reected by the numbers of rms mi. Hence, bi = mi; for all i 2 I;
where  is a positive parameter.
Our main focus is on the following two-stage game, named the game
with permit trading (superscript T is used to indicate the solution to this
game):
Stage 1: Each government chooses its initial endowment of emissions
permits !i (emission target, for shor) . The permits are transferred to
the rms.
Stage 2: Firms, which all have access to an international permit market
where the unit price is p, select their level of abatement aji.
Note that even though we presume that all governments play individ-
ually and noncooperatively against all other governments, some items
must still be negotiated and agreed upon. In particular, governments
must agree that permits issued in any country are recognized as docu-
ments suitable for compliance in their own country. It is also assumed
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that governments comply with their obligations by enforcing rms to
fully match their emissions with their corresponding number of permits.
We start with stage 2 of the game. Abatement ai in country i 2 I
is determined such that each rm is maximizing its net income from
permit sales minus its abatement costs. It follows that ai satises
@ci (ai)
@ai
= p , (3)
and the rmsmarginal abatement costs will be equalized. Hence, there
will be an e¢ cient allocation of abatement e¤orts both within and across
countries.
At stage 1 each government i 2 I maximizes national welfare i (!)
with respect to !i, where
i (!) := bi
X
j2I
aj (!)  i
2
a2i + p (!) (!i   ei + ai (!)) .
Hence, a Nash equilibrium is characterized by the rst-order conditions
bi 
X
j2I
@aj
@!i
  c0i (ai (!)) 
@ai
@!i
+
@p
@!i
(!i   ei + ai (!))+ p

1 +
@ai
@!i

= 0;
(4)
for all i 2 I.
Next, sum the left hand side of (4) for all i 2 I, taking into account
that the price e¤ect of increased supply of permits is the same irrespec-
tive of the additional permitscountry of origin and that
P
i2I (!i   ei + ai (!)) =
0 as well as the rst order condition (3): Then we have that
p = b; (5)
where b = (1=n)
P
j2I bj, see also MacKenzie (2011).
Using that i = =mi as well as (2) and (3), we have that
aTi =
mi

p (6)
for all i 2 I. Dene m : = fm1; :::;mng and M :=
P
i2I mi: Note that
(5) means that p = (=n)
P
mi. Thus, we have that
aTi =
mi


n
M: (7)
7
Global abatement follows:
aT (m) =


1
n
M2: (8)
Let ei be the businessasusual emissions of country i and ! := (!1; :::; !n)
a prole of targets. Then ! and the market-clearing conditionX
i2I
(ei   ai) =
X
i2I
!i (9)
determine a unique equilibrium permit price p (!) > 0: Furthermore,
from (6), this in turn determines the abatement ai (!) for all i 2 I.
From the above results we have that global welfare in the equilibrium
of the game described above is given by:
T (m) =
2


n  1
2
n2

M3; (10)
where T :=
P
i2N 
T
i :
For comparison only, we next dene a game of reference, labeled the
game without trade (superscript N is used to indicate the solution to this
game). This game follows the same procedure as of the game described
above, with the exception that there is no international permit market.
Hence, at the second stage of the game rms set their abatement levels
such that aNi = !
N
i . At the rst stage of the game the governments
set their target !i to the level which maximizes bi
 P
i2N ai
   ci (ai) :
Hence, the abatement levels become:
aNi =
bi
i
: (11)
It follows that global emission abatement and welfare in the equilibrium
of this game are:
aN (m) =


X
i2I
m2i ; (12)
N (m) =
2

 
M
 
nX
j=1
m2j
!
  1
2
nX
j=1
m3j
!
: (13)
Our main result follows:
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Proposition 1 If there exists at least one pair (i; j) such that mi 6= mj;
i; j 2 I; then we have that
aN (m) > aT (m) ;
N (m) > T (m) :
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 states that trade reduces e¢ ciency and increases emissions.
Certain intuitive conclusions ow from this result. In the game with trad-
ing, rms choose their emissions levels such that marginal abatement
costs c0i (ai) equal the international permit price p = b. For instance, in
the case of a large economy (above average number of rms) we have
that bi > p = b; and this country will end up as a permit importer and
c0i (ai) < bi. Without trade we have that c
0
i (ai) = bi: Hence, this coun-
try will reduce its abatement as trading is introduced. Correspondingly,
small economies increase their abatement due to trade. Moreover, it fol-
lows from (2) and the denition of i that small economies have steeper
marginal abatement cost functions compared to larger economies, and
consequently a large economy must therefore carry out a larger down-
ward adjustment of its abatement level than small economies must adjust
their abatement upwards. It follows that aN (m) > aT (m).
The intuition behind the result that N (m) > T (m) is more straight-
forward. In a non-cooperative equilibrium, global abatement is ine¢ -
ciently low. International emissions trading will lead to even lower total
abatement. Hence, emissions trading on the one hand gives an e¢ ciency
gain due to e¢ cient cross-border abatement allocation, but on the other
an ine¢ ciently low abatement level is further reduced and this last e¤ect
dominates.
3 Concluding remarks
The world community is struggling to come together and negotiate an
e¤ective and ambitious climate agreement. The process for determining
national emission quotas in the most recent agreements does not resem-
ble e¢ cient bargaining, and is possibly closer to a formalization of a
classical noncooperative equilibrium. In this paper we have shown that
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within a simple climate policy game, emissions trading in this situation
leads to increased emissions and reduced e¢ ciency.
A Appendix
Proof. Proposition 1 claims that if there exists an i and j; such that
mi 6= mj; i; j 2 N; then
aN (m) > aT (m) ; (A.1)
N (m) > T (m) : (A.2)
where we use m : = fm1; :::;mng : In order to prove this, dene a vector
m with n identical elements m =M=n
m := f m; :::; m| {z }
n elements
g: (A.3)
It follows from (8), (10), (12) and (13) that
aN ( m) = aT ( m) = aT (m) ; (A.4)
N ( m) = T ( m) = T (m) : (A.5)
It follows that if
aN (m) > aN ( m) ; (A.6)
N (m) > N ( m) ; (A.7)
then (A.1) and (A.2) apply. In the following we will therefore show that
(A.6) and (A.7) apply. Firstly, dene
mk :=
1
k
kX
j=1
mj; k = 1; :::; n;
which is the basic building block in a set of n element vectors mk;
k 2 f1; :::; ng; where the rst k elements are equal to the average size of
m1; :::;mk in the vector m such that
mk := f mk; :::; mk;| {z }
k elements
mk+1; :::;mng:
Note that m1 =m and mn = m: In order to show that (A.6) and (A.7)
apply, we will prove that we have two chains of inequalities where
aN (m)  aN ( m2)  :::  aN ( mn 1)  aN ( m) ; (A.8)
N (m)  N ( m2)  :::  N ( mn 1)  N ( m) ; (A.9)
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and that if there exists at least one pair (i; j) such thatmi 6= mj; then at
least one of the inequalities in each of these two chains is strict: Consider
rstly inequality number k in (A.8). We have
aN ( mk) =


 
k m2k +m
2
k+1 +
nX
j=k+2
m2j
!
; (A.10)
aN ( mk+1) =


 
(k + 1) m2k+1 +
nX
j=k+2
m2j
!
: (A.11)
Subtracting the expression in (A.10) from the expression in (A.11) gives
that
aN ( mk)  aN ( mk+1) = 

 
k m2k +m
2
k+1 +
nX
j=k+2
m2j
!
  

 
(k + 1) m2k+1 +
nX
j=k+2
m2j
!
;
which could be reformulated to


 
k m2k +m
2
k+1 +
nX
j=k+2
m2j   (k + 1) m2k+1  
nX
j=k+2
m2j
!
:
Hence, we have that
aN ( mk)  aN ( mk+1) = 

 
k m2k +m
2
k+1   (k + 1) m2k+1

:
Recall that we have:
mk+1 =
1
k + 1
kX
j=1
mj +
1
k + 1
mk+1;
which gives that
mk+1 =
1
k + 1
(k mk +mk+1) :
Hence, we have that:
aN ( mk)  aN ( mk+1) = 


k m2k +m
2
k+1  
1
k + 1
((k mk +mk+1))
2

;
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which gives:
aN ( mk)  aN ( mk+1) = 

k
k + 1
(mk+1   mk)2 : (A.12)
Hence, we have shown that aN ( mk)  aN ( mk+1) for any k 2 f1; :::; ng
and the inequality is strict if mk+1 6= mk: Therefore, all inequalities in
(A.8) apply, and because we assume there exists an i and j; such that
mi 6= mj; i; j 2 N; then (A.1) applies.
Next, we will show that (A.2) applies. Dene Mk :=
Pk
i=1mi: It
follows from (13) and the denitions above that
N ( mk) =
2


Mk+1
 
k m2k +m
2
k+1
  1
2
 
k m3k +m
3
k+1

+
nX
j=k+2
Nj ( mk) ;
N ( mk+1) =
2


Mk+1 (k + 1) m
2
k+1  
1
2
(k + 1) m3k+1

+
nX
j=k+2
Nj ( mk+1) ;
Using a similar procedure as used when nding (A.12), it is possible to
show that
N ( mk)  N ( mk 1) = 
2

k
2 (k + 1)2
( mk  mk+1)2
 (kMk+1 + (k   1) (k + 1) mk) (A.13)
+
"
nX
j=k+2
 
Nj ( mk)  Nj ( mk+1)
#
:
The square bracket is non-negative because (A.8) says that aN ( mk) 
aN ( mk+1), which means that countries k + 2; :::; n will collect at least
as large payo¤s in the case with mk as with mk+1: The rest of the right
hand side of (A.13) is non-negative if n > 2; and strictly positive if
mk 6= mk+1: It follows that the inequality N ( mk)  N ( mk+1) applies,
and is strict if mk 6= mk+1.
The corresponding argument applies to all the inequalities in (A.9)).
Hence, we have proven that (A.7) is true, which means that (A.2) is true
as well.
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